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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Climate change has been a security issue for mankind since 
Homo sapiens first emerged on the planet, driving him to 
find new and better food, water, shelter, and basic resources 
for survival and the advancement of civilization. Only 
recently, however, has the rate of climate change coupled 
with man’s knowledge of his own role in that change 
accelerated, perhaps profoundly, changing the security 
paradigm. If we take a ―decades‖ look at the security issue, 
we see competition for natural resources giving way to Cold 
War ideological containment and deterrence, itself giving 
way to non-state terrorism and extremism. While we 
continue to defend against these threats, we are faced with 
even greater security challenges that inextricably tie 
economic, food and human security together and where the 
flash points may not provide clearly discernable causes, as 
they will be intrinsically tied to climate change. 
Several scientific reports have revealed that the modest 
development gains that can be realized by some regions 
could be reversed by climate change. This means that 
climate change is not just a long-term environmental threat 
as was widely believed, but an economic and developmental 
disaster that is unfolding.  As such, addressing climate 
change has become central to the development and poverty 
reduction by the World Bank and other financial institutions. 
In Latin America, poorer countries and communities, such as 
those found in Central America, will suffer the hardest 
because of weaker resilience and greater reliance on climate-
sensitive sectors such as agriculture. The US should attempt 
to deliver capability to assist these states to deal with the 
effects of climate change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the past, the common symptoms of human environmental 
impact have been urban-industrial air pollution, chemically 
polluted waterways and the manifestations of urban squalor 
in both rich and poor countries. These local hazards are now 
being supplemented with those due to changes in some of the 
planet’s great biophysical and ecological systems, and hence 
there are additional and larger-scale impacts.
 
This impact, 
due significantly to climate change, has influenced the 
functioning of many ecosystems, the seasonal cycles, and 
geographic range of plants and creatures
1
, thus affecting food 
production and water availability. These ―at risk‖ ecosystems 
provide society with a number of goods (e.g., food, fiber, 
fuel, pharmaceutical products) and services that are essential 
to human health and well-being, and form the basis of our 
modern economies. Climate change is, therefore, seen not 
just as an environmental threat, but a threat that is cross-
cutting and can affect all of the key economic sectors.
2
  
 
Climate change will, in many countries result in large scale 
starvation, as previously productive agricultural areas dry up 
or become inundated by flooding. This could in turn lead to 
mass migrations and deaths of a scale never before seen.  In 
fact, it would be much larger than the Irish migration due to 
the potato blight in the 1840s, where nearly two million 
people—a quarter of Ireland’s population then-- migrated to 
the U.S. Additionally, diseases will become more prevalent 
in many areas and, due to the global interconnectedness of 
modern society, will spread rapidly from nation to nation. As 
countries fight to control disease and migration, others will 
                                                 
1
 Susan Hassol, Impacts of a warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press) 2004.  
2
 Anthony Nyong, ―Climate-Related Conflicts in West Africa,‖ 
Environmental Change and Security Program Report, Issue 12, 
(Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development) 2006-
2007.  
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be seeking to relieve the pressure through exploitation of 
new areas of natural resources, causing increased border 
incursions/disputes and conflict. 
    
Addressing climate change through stand-alone projects will 
not achieve the desired outcomes because of its cross-cutting 
nature. Therefore, the optimum strategy calls for a 
mainstreaming approach, where climate change concerns are 
integrated into programs and projects of development banks 
and other international institutions, as well as into 
governmental developmental planning and security 
processes. Additionally, military and national security 
experts must understand climate change and its root causes 
in order to identify potential routes to conflict and those 
interagency development programs that mitigate that threat.   
 
In a 2007 publication titled, “National Security and the 
Threat of Climate Change,”  the CNA Corporation’s Military 
Advisory Board set the stage for future military studies in 
climate change, by stating the following: 
 
Carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere are greater 
now than at any time in the past 650,000 years, and 
the average global temperature has continued a 
steady rise. This rise presents the prospect of 
significant climate change, and while uncertainty 
exists, and debate continues regarding the science 
and future extent of projected climate changes, the 
trends are clear. 
The nature and pace at which climate change is 
being observed today and the consequences projected 
by the consensus scientific opinion are grave and 
pose equally grave implications for our national 
security. Moving beyond the arguments of cause-and-
effect, it is important that the US military begin 
planning to address these potentially devastating 
effects. The consequences of climate change can 
affect the organization, in terms of training, 
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equipping, and planning of the military services. The 
US military has a clear obligation to determine the 
potential impacts of climate change on its ability to 
execute its mission in support of national security 
objectives. 
Climate change can act as a threat multiplier for 
instability in some of the most volatile regions of the 
world, and it presents significant national security 
challenges for the United States. Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to start now to help mitigate the severity 
of some of these emerging challenges. The decision to 
act should be made soon in order to plan prudently 
for the nation’s security. 3 
 
This paper identifies the current issues in climate change and 
focuses on Central American countries that are most at risk 
of developing profound security challenges. It looks first at 
the scientific basics of greenhouse gases, and their effects 
and consequences.  It then documents current agreements 
and protocols that in and of themselves may spawn 
international conflict.  Finally, it identifies some emerging 
policies and economic incentives for potential mitigation of 
challenges that countries in Central America will face as a 
result of climate change. 
 
GREENHOUSE EFFECT 
 
Since the earth’s natural “Greenhouse effect” was first 
described in 1824 by the French physicist, Joseph Fourier, 
scientists have documented that fossil fuel burning and other 
industrial activities have been emitting billions of tons of 
global warming emissions. Most of the short wavelength 
radiation (high energy) coming from the sun are absorbed by 
the earth’s surface. However, some of this radiation is re-
emitted as long wavelength (infrared) radiation, (Heat).  
                                                 
3 Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of Climate 
Change, (Alexandria, Va.: CNA, April 2007). 
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Greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere allow short 
wavelength radiation to pass through to the earth’s surface, 
but trap much of the reflected long wavelength radiation 
causing what is called the ―Greenhouse effect‖ or global 
warming. 
 
Figure 1: A Schematic Illustration of the Greenhouse 
Effect
4
  
 
The potential cause and focus in recent years has been on 
―global warming‖ but more recently the terminology has 
shifted to ―climate change.‖  Scientist disagree on whether 
―manmade‖ global warming has set off the current global 
warming trend, or whether we are really on the verge of the 
                                                 
4
 "The Greenhouse Effect & Greenhouse Gases," Windows to the 
Universe, 
http://www.windows2universe.org/earth/climate/greenhouse_effect_gase
s.html. 
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next great Ice Age. Rather than enter the political and 
philosophical debates, this paper assumes that greenhouse 
gases are significantly impacting the environment and 
causing rapid variations in the climate. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
projected a globally averaged warming of about 0.3 to 0.4oF 
per decade for a range of scenarios of GHG emissions over 
the next 20 years. The total temperature increase between 
1850–1899 and 2001–2005 reached 0.76 °C. In fact, 5 of 21 
IPCC models projected that the average warming will exceed 
7.2oF by the end of the century with the largest warming in 
the US expected to occur during winter over northern 
Alaska. These warming trends vary geographically and 
further play into the dramatic climate discourse. The 
temperature of the world’s oceans has also been rising, and 
mountain glaciers and snow cover have declined in both 
hemispheres. All these phenomena contribute to an average 
global sea level rise of 1.8 mm per year from 1961 to 2003, 
and at a faster rate – about 3.1 mm from 1993 to 2003. The 
scientists5 have agreed that emissions have to be limited to 
44 Gtonne CO2e by 2020 to stay on a 2 degree limitation 
course. Based on the Copenhagen Accord pledges, the 
emissions in 2020 could be 49 Gtonne under a good 
scenario, but as high as 53 Gtonne (almost like business-as-
usual) in the bad scenario.6  
 
GHGs, as defined in the Kyoto Protocol, consist primarily of 
six gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs) and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). Since pre-industrial 
times, the atmospheric concentration of GHGs has grown 
significantly with carbon dioxide concentration increasing by 
about 31%, methane by about 150% and nitrous oxide by 
                                                 
5 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005. Ecosystems and Human 
Well-being: Synthesis, Island Press, Washington, DC. 
6 World Bank, "Climate Change by the Numbers" 2003, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/WDI0
8_section3_intro.pdf. 
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about 16%.7  The fluorinated compounds, although present in 
relatively much lower concentrations in the global 
atmosphere when compared with carbon dioxide and 
methane, have significantly larger global warming potentials 
(GWP) of up to 22,000 times greater than that of carbon 
dioxide and methane, which have GWPs of 1 and 23 
respectively. GWP is a basis for comparing each gas’s ability 
to trap heat. Furthermore, hydro-fluorocarbons have seen the 
highest percentage increase in concentration since 1998.8 
Table 1 shows the sources of greenhouse gases and the 
global warming potential of each gas. 
                                                 
7 Luis M. Galindo, Carlos de Miguel, and Jimy Ferrer, "Vital Climate 
Change Graphics for Latin America and the Caribbean (2010) - Maps 
and Graphics at UNEP/GRID-Arendal," Maps and Graphics at 
UNEP/GRID-Arendal, June 2010,  
http://www.grida.no/_res/site/file/publications/LAC_Web_eng_2011-01-
03.pdf. 
8 Lenny Bernstein, et al., Climate Change 2007:Synthesis Report, IPCC,  
November 2007. 
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Table 1: Source of Greenhouse Gases and their Global 
Warming Potential 
 
Name  Symbol Common Sources GWP 
Carbon Dioxide CO2 Fossil Fuel 
Combustion  
1 
  Forest Clearing  
  Industrial 
Production 
Processes 
 
Methane CH4 Landfills  25 
  Natural Gas 
Production 
 
  Fermentation From 
Livestock 
 
Nitrous Oxide N2O Soil Management 298 
  Fossil Fuel 
Combustion 
 
  Fertilizers 
(production and 
application ) 
 
Hydro-
fluorocarbons 
HFCs Refrigeration Gases 140-
11,700 
  Semiconductor 
Manufacturing 
 
Perfluorocarbon PFCs Aluminum 
Production 
7,850 
  Semiconductor 
Industry 
 
Sulfur 
Hexafluoride 
SF6 Electrical 
Transmission 
Systems 
23,900 
  Magnesium 
Production 
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GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 
 
Predictions by climate models of the GHGs influence on 
global temperature increase and various other environmental 
indicators prompted the formation of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988.
9
 The Kyoto 
Protocol was adopted by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCCC) in 1997 to 
reduce emissions by an average of 5% by the period 2008-
2012.  To date, 186 countries have ratified the convention. 
The U.S. did not choose to become a signatory to the 
protocol although it is a signatory to the UNFCCC, placing 
the U.S. outside of the international norm.
10
 
 
The Kyoto Protocol was outlined to make the convention 
operational in 1997, whereby 39 developed countries (Annex 
1 countries) made legally binding commitments to reduce 
their GHG emissions by an average of 5.2% relative to 1990 
to be achieved by 2008 -2012: the so called ―First 
Commitment Period.‖11 Countries without targets (non-
Annex 1 countries) can receive investments from Annex 1 
countries by hosting Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol established a belief that a wealthy 
minority of the world's countries and corporations are the 
principal cause of climate change. The foundation of further 
global climate justice movements stem from this and further 
believe the adverse effects of climate change fall first and 
foremost on the developing nations that suffer the greatest 
percentage of the global poverty.  The provisions for this 
Protocol end December 2012 and hence the push for a 
                                                 
9
 Ibid.  
10
 Galindo L., op. cit. 
11
 Ben H. de Jong, et al., ―Greenhouse gas mitigation potential of 
combining forest management and bioenergy substitution: A case study 
from Central Highlands of Michoacán, Mexico.‖ Forest Ecology and 
Management 30 April 2007: p. 398-411. 
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continuation at the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 and again in 
Cancun in 2010.  
 
The debacle of the Copenhagen Accord12 is a direct result of 
the fact that developing countries (led by China) and 
communities are unlikely to ignore the wealthy nation’s 
historical responsibility for the causes and consequences of 
climate change. They also perceive that the wealthy minority 
continues to consume an excessive proportion of the Earth's 
limited environmental space. Furthermore, there appears to 
be some resentment and mistrust of proposals, if adopted, 
which would lock developing countries into low and rapidly 
decreasing per-capita shares, denying them the 
environmental space needed to build the houses, schools, 
roads and infrastructure that developed countries possess. 
Such proposals are deemed to deepen the debt of developed 
countries rather than honoring it, leveraging past injustices 
into a future climate regime, and proposing a system in 
which the "polluter profits" and the "poor pays" for the 
excessive historical and current consumption of the rich 
countries.13 In fact, President Evo Morales of Bolivia, hosted 
his own Climate Change Conference in April 2010 to further 
push similar ideas and challenge the UN, and more 
importantly, the US. 
 
On a global scale, China and the United States are the largest 
and second largest overall contributors to global warming at 
24% and 22%, respectively. However, in respect to per 
capita and per GNP, the United States far exceeds the rest of 
the world (see Figure 2).  This spurs the grand debate of who 
pays for the impact. 
 
                                                 
12 Hassol S., op. cit. 
13 World Bank, "Climate Change by the Numbers" 2003, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/WDI0
8_section3_intro.pdf. 
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Figure 2: Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Emissions per 
Capita and per GNP
14
 
 
 
 
At the IFCCC Cancun 2010, the US had two goals: reinforce 
an international agreement on climate change that entails 
comparable efforts from all major GHG emitters, and avoid 
being blamed if the talks are seen to fail. However, China 
was a critical barrier to achieving both goals because it 
continues to demand that all developed countries including 
the US, adopt legally binding international obligations to cut 
                                                 
14
 "Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Emissions per Capita and per GNP," 
Gapminder: Unveiling the beauty of statistics for a fact based world 
view, http://www.gapminder.org. 
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their own emissions, while insisting that all others, including 
China, be exempt.
15
  
 
The inability of the US administration to make a meaningful 
commitment to reduce its emissions to an adequate extent 
has been problematic. In fact, it is now clear that Congress 
will not adopt a comprehensive climate bill. As such, other 
developed countries are reluctant to honor their own 
commitments, or even retain the existing regulated system. 
Furthermore, Russia and Japan have openly indicated a 
reluctance to continue with the Kyoto Protocol, due to the 
non-involvement of the US.  Other major developing 
countries have also shown a reluctance to adhere to the 
binding disciplines. The Vice Minister and senior climate 
negotiator of Japan has been quoted as saying, ―Japan will 
not agree to extend Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012 even if it 
means isolating itself at the UN‖.  Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada, among others, have also been unwilling or 
reluctant to commit to Kyoto's second period. That leaves the 
European Union, which although it has said that it would 
prefers to shift to a new system, is still open to remaining in 
the Kyoto Protocol, if others do. Only Norway has firmly 
agreed to a second Kyoto Protocol period. 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
The major anticipated impacts of climate change are on 
agriculture and food security, forest composition, health and 
productivity, water resources, coastal erosion and inundation, 
modification of biodiversity, and eco-systems. Temperatures 
are projected to raise an additional 2-5
o
F in the 21
st
 Century 
producing heat waves, storms, floods, hurricanes and rising 
sea levels due to melting glaciers.
16
  Due to geographical and 
                                                 
15
 Brian M. Fagan,  loods  fa ines  and e perors   l Ni o and the fate 
of civilizations, (New York, NY: Basic Books), 1999. 
16
 Lenny Bernstein, et al., Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report,  IPCC 
November 2007.  
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climatic variances, the temperature rise varies by region. 
Vulnerable regions in both the northern and southern 
hemisphere will bear the brunt of the effect of climate 
change. NASA satellite images have revealed that a 
significant amount of Arctic ice has disappeared to about 
half of what it was five years ago. Greenland’s ice sheet has 
lost almost 19 billion tonnes of its volume, which prompted 
climate scientist Jay Zwally to remark, ―At this rate, the 
Arctic Ocean could be nearly ice-free by 2012‖.17  This may 
present both a more traditional security threat, as nations 
such as Russia, race to claim the opening oil and seabed 
riches, as well as control the Northwest Passage, which could 
reignite and expand a regional risk, as well as a climate 
change risk of enormous proportions. The conditions of life 
on Earth have already been altered, even as we remain 
largely ignorant of the long-term consequences on 
biodiversity.
18
 The opening of the Arctic Passage would have 
a huge economic effect on the Panama because, if it remains 
open all year long, it would offer a shorter route sea transport 
and obviates the need for usage of the Panama Canal.  This 
would have a tremendous impact to Panama’s economy. 
 
Central America is already experiencing adverse effects of 
climate change.  This include sea level rise, temperature 
increases, predicted water shortages and other related 
phenomena such as increased tropical cyclones/hurricanes, 
coral bleaching, among others, as will be discussed below. 
 
                                                                                                    
 
17
 Seth Borenstein, ―Artic Sea Ice Gone in Summer within Five Years?‖ 
National Geographic News, Washington Associated Press, 12 December 
2007, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/12/071212-AP-
arctic-melt.html. 
18
 Richard M. Adams and Dannele E. Peck. "Drought and Climate 
Change: Implications For The West." Western Economics Forum 1.2 
(2002): 14-19. AgEcon Search, 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/27990. 
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CENTRAL AMERICA:  EFFECT OF TEMPERATURE 
INCREASE 
Rise in Sea Level 
 
Central American countries all have in common socio-
economic challenges. Among these are: a heavy dependence 
upon the natural resource base (agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
tourism); susceptibility to the vagaries of international trade; 
lack of economies of scale; high transportation and 
communication costs; extreme vulnerability to natural 
disasters; scarce land resources; and ever increasing 
pressures on coastal and marine environments. Therefore, 
rising sea levels potentially threaten all coastal regions in 
Central America. The following sections specifically address 
the various trends of sea level rise as a result of temperature 
increase over the past two decades.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
Figure 3: Local Trends in Sea Level determined over an 
18 year (1992 - 2010) Period. 
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Predicted Water Shortages on Agriculture and Food 
Security 
 
Changes in temperature and precipitation in Central America 
will very likely decrease the cover of vegetation that protects 
the ground surface from wind and water erosion in certain 
areas, turning currently productive farmland into an 
ecological disaster similar to the dust bowl experienced in 
the American and Canadian prairies in the 1930s. Studies 
have shown that climate change associated with increasing 
levels of carbon dioxide is likely to affect developed and 
developing countries differentially, with major 
vulnerabilities occurring in low-latitude regions.
19
  In certain 
regions, the risk of crop failure on a year-to-year basis is 
likely to increase. According to the UNFCCC, a possible 
manifestation of the impact of climate change on small states 
includes a shortening of the sugar cane growing season in 
Belize, which could result in an acceleration of maturation 
that would reduce yields by up to about 30 per cent.   
 
Developing countries already struggle with large and 
growing populations, and malnutrition rates would be 
particularly vulnerable to changes in food production.
20
  
Changes in the distribution of plant pests have implications 
for food safety. Ocean warming would increase the number 
of temperature-sensitive toxins produced by phytoplankton, 
causing contamination of seafood more often at an increased 
frequency of poisoning. Control of ambient conditions in the 
food production process, including animal husbandry and 
                                                 
19
 V. Ramaswamy and J.R. Christy, "Temperature Trends in the Lower 
Atmosphere: Steps for Understanding and Reconciling Differences," 
January 2010, (United States Global Climate Change Science Program), 
http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap1-1/finalreport/sap1-1-
final-all.pdf. 
20
 Anthony J. McMichael and R. Sari Kovats, "Climate Change and 
Climate Variability: Adaptatins to Reduce Adverse Health." 
Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 61.1 (2000): 49-64.  
17 
 
slaughtering, to avoid the adverse effects of climate change 
is highly recommended.
21
 
 
Forests are defined by the Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF) as tree crown coverage of between 10 - 
30% with trees that are between 2 – 5 meters tall over a 
minimum area of 0.05 – 1.0 hectares. Afforestation, 
reforestation, deforestation and forest management provide 
relatively low cost opportunities to combat climate change 
by serving as a carbon sink for removal of greenhouse gases. 
Afforestation addresses land that has not been forested for at 
least 50 years, whereas reforestation is confined to land that 
was not forested as of December 31, 1989.    Based on 
NASA Landsat satellite imagery from 1980 – 201022, 
Belize’s forest cover has declined from 75.9% in 1980 to 
62.7% as of late February 2010. Average annual 
deforestation was estimated at 0.6%, equaling the clearing of 
some 24,835 acres (9,982 hectares) of forest per year. 
Protected areas have helped to conserved forests, with only a 
small percent of forests being cleared within the past thirty 
years, as compared with a quarter of forests outside of 
protected areas during the period.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Ana R. Moreno, ―Climate Change and Human Health in Latin 
America: Drivers, Effects, and Policies‖, Reg Environ Change, 6, pp. 
157-164, 2006.   
http://www.environmentalexpert.com/Files/0/articles/8845/Climatechang
eandhumanhealth.pdf. 
22
 E.R. Anderson, E.A Cherrington, A.I. Flores, J.B. Perez, R. Carrillo, 
Carrillo R., and E. Sempris. 2008. "Potential Impacts of Climate Change 
on Biodiversity in Central America, Mexico, and the Dominican 
Republic." CATHALAC / USAID. Panama City, Panama.  
18 
 
Figure 4: Decline of Belize’s Forest Cover from 1980 to 
201023 
 
 
                                                 
23 Galindo L., op. cit. 
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Water Resources and Water Security 
 
Annual precipitation in parts of Latin America is predicted to 
decrease as climate change worsens, and there is some 
evidence that this has begun to happen. In other areas, access 
to potable water is threatened whenever major flooding or 
landslides occur as evidenced in Belize, Guatemala and 
Honduras. As such, whether water supply is threatened by 
excess precipitation or by droughts, many countries have 
taken measures to ensure an adequate supply of water. 
Nicaragua for example, has plans to build infrastructure to 
store rainwater, to increase water security in times of 
drought. An example of situations to be avoided in Central 
America is a reduction in quality and quantity of water due 
to climate change, as has happened in Bolivia. This 
prompted an attempt of privatization of water in two of the 
three largest cities, Cochabamba and La Paz/El Alto, which 
led to civil unrest.
24
 The two concessions to foreign private 
companies in the respective cities were prematurely ended in 
2000 and 2006 respectively. This is a glaring example where, 
a multinational corporation seized an opportunity to provide 
a commodity from what was perceived by locals, as a 
naturally inherited resource (water), which threatened the 
national security of Bolivia. 
 
Impact of Climate Change on Ecosystems 
 
Biodiversivity (the variety of all forms of life, from genes to 
species to ecosystems) is a fundamental building block of 
many of the services that ecosystems provide.  Biodiversity 
contributes to the function of an ecosystem and is difficult or 
impossible to recover or replace once it has eroded.
25
 In an 
                                                 
24
 Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of Climate 
Change, (Alexandria,Va.: CAN) April 2007. 
25
 Peter Backlund, et al., 2008. "The Effects of Climate Change on 
Agriculture, Land Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity in the 
United States," Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.3 Report by the U.S. 
Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global 
20 
 
analysis of 866 peer-reviewed papers exploring the 
ecological consequences of climate change worldwide, 
nearly 60% of the 1,598 species studied exhibited shifts in 
their distributions and/or timing of their annual cycles that 
correspond to large-scale climate change patterns. 
Maintaining the integrity of ecosystems, such as forest 
habitat and wetlands, can provide defense against outbreaks 
of the opportunists that carry diseases, and provide a buffer 
against climate vagaries and extremes, whether or not there 
is any change in the overall climate regime. Early 
interventions can save money and lives.
26
  Mangrove 
accretion on land may or may not be able to keep pace with 
rising sea levels, depending on the composition of the forest, 
tidal range and sediment supply. Mangrove forests could be 
lost with a one meter rise in sea level in some states.  
 
Climate Change Severity Index 
 
Dynamics and impacts of climate change involve complex 
feedback loops driven by human-produced greenhouse gases 
emitted into the atmosphere; therefore, it is necessary to 
develop models that demonstrate potential scenarios in the 
future. The most sophisticated models include the flow of 
atmosphere, oceanic, glacial, and terrestrial energy and mass. 
Each of these models is run numerous times under different 
conditions, as defined by Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios (SRFS), prepared for IPCC. These scenarios 
represent best case and worst case scenarios under different 
circumstances in which the population, economy, 
technology, energy, and land-use, change and grow with 
time. Consequently, development interests can be more 
directed at increasing human wealth, or they can be more 
                                                                                                    
Change Research and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research. 
June, 2010; Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
26
 Paul R. Epstein, "Climate, Ecology and Human Health,‖ 
Consequences: The Nature and Implications of Environmental Change, 
1997;3(2), U.S. Global Research Information Office. 
http://www.gcrio.org/CONSEQUENCES/vol3no2/climhealth.html. 
21 
 
concerned with fostering a sustainable future by preserving 
the environment.  
 
Anderson et al.
27
 assessed the potential impacts of climate 
change on the biodiversity of Belize, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama by 
identifying the critical habitats: places where climate change 
is projected to most greatly threaten biodiversity. This model 
describes the spatial distribution of ecosystems in terms of a 
Climate Change Severity Index (CCSI).  
 
CCSI is a measure of how far a location will be placed 
outside of its current climate comfort zone. It is constructed 
utilizing baseline climate data and derived monthly anomaly 
data. The spatial scales depend on the detail of the available 
climate data and the raw quantitative values are interpreted 
as shown in Table 2:  
 
Table 2: Range and Significance of CCSI Values
28
 
 
Values Severity 
0 - 0.24 Low severity 
0.25 - 0.49 Approaching significant changes 
0.5 - 0.74 Significant changes vary during year 
0.75 - 0.99 Pushing comfort zone limits 
  1.00 -1.99 Outside comfort zone 
2.00+ Far outside comfort zone 
 
                                                 
27
 E.R. Anderson, E.A Cherrington, A.I. Flores, J.B. Perez, R. Carrillo, 
Carrillo R., and E. Sempris. 2008, opp cit.  
28
 Galindo L., op. cit. 
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The CCSI itself is derived from two variables: Temperature 
Change Severity Index and a Precipitation Change Severity 
Index. 
 
Temperature Change Severity Index (CCSIt):  = 
 
 
Precipitation Change Severity Index (CCSIp):  = 
 
 
and Climate Change Severity Index (CCSI):  = 
 
 
The potential impact of climate change within a given 
ecosystem depends on its elevation because vegetation at 
lower altitude has a higher risk of being impacted. 
Furthermore, significant consideration is given to ecosystems 
of very small extents with a very high average CCSI. The 
impact of climate change on species-rich ecosystems and 
Central America can be assessed in terms of a worst case or 
a best case scenario as depicted in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Conceptual Breakdown of Climate Change for 
Best and Worst Case Scenarios
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The following maps (Figure 6) display climate change 
severity index in terms of vegetation/land cover for the best 
case and worst case scenarios in Central America by the 
2020s and 2050s.  
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Technology 
Energy 
Agriculture 
(Land-use) 
 
 
Best Case 
Sustainable Development Human Equity 
Worst Case 
Unsustainable and unequal economic growth 
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Figure 6:  Climate change Severity Index in 2020s; (a) 
Best Case Scenario and (b) Worst Case Scenario
30
  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
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Figure 7: Climate change Severity Index in 2050s; (a) 
Best Case Scenario and (b) Worst Case Scenario
31
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
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While only a few countries Belize, Nicaragua and Honduras 
have the higher severity classes, in the best case scenario, by 
2020 every country is projected to experience these changes, 
except for Guatemala. Therefore, the aforementioned 
projections suggest that in the light of the fact that 
Guatemala is the most unstable and the poorest in the 
hemisphere, government officials while being cognizant of 
the effects of climate change, may well devote fewer 
resources to mitigation efforts. As shown in Figure 7, it is 
possible that movement outside of the comfort zone will 
occur somewhere in every Central American country. 
 
Figure 8: Average Climate Change Severity Index per 
Vegetation/Land Cover, Worst Case Scenario in the 
2020s
32
 
 
It should be noted that the CCSI maps depicted above do not 
locate actual ecosystems where climate change is projected 
to be more severe. However, the following graphs provide 
trends of the potential impact of climate change on species-
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rich ecosystems in terms of vegetation/land cover and 
altitude under worst case scenarios by the 2020s. 
 
Figure 9: Average Climate Change Severity Index per 
Altitudinal Level, Worst Case Scenario in the 2020s.
33
 
 
As seen in Figure 8, most ecosystems except for shrub land 
will experience some conditions far outside their comfort 
zone under the worst scenario in the 2020s. Broadleaf forests 
and agriculture, in particular have the highest percentage of 
climate changes that are projected to move outside of the 
comfort zone.  Savannas and mangroves also have 
considerable amounts of highly susceptible areas. It is 
evident from the ecosystem map that shrub land, broadleaf 
forests, and agriculture are the most extensive land cover 
types and that nearly a quarter of the broadleaf forests have a 
high severity index. Additionally, there is cause for concern 
that 30% of agricultural areas are also projected to 
experience highly severe climatic changes. 
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In terms of altitude, there seems to be a decreasing trend of 
severity with increasing elevation. This is most likely 
because ecosystems at higher altitudes are more adaptable to 
greater ranges in temperature; thus, they could potentially be 
more resilient to the changes in climate. 
 
In the worst case scenario, projected climate change with 
altitude approaches the comfort zone limits or is outside the 
comfort zone (purple or red) in only submontane, lowlands 
and unclassified altitudinal classes (Figure 9). As seen in 
Figure 6 and 7, these classes of higher severity lie in parts of 
Costa Rica, Panama and Nicaragua. Whereas, in the worst 
case scenario, every class of vegetation or land cover type 
except shrub land is projected to experience movements 
outside of the comfort zone (Figure  7). 
 
POLICY RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, there are three mechanisms by 
which GHGs can be reduced,  namely Clean Development 
Mechanism (dedicated for developing countries), Emissions 
Trading (Cap-and-Trade) and Joint Implementation, which 
allows Annex 1 countries with reduction commitments to 
invest in projects that reduce emissions in other Annex 1 
countries. 
  
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
 
The CDM was established by Article 12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol of the UNFCCC to enable developed countries to 
offset their emissions by funding climate change mitigation 
projects in non-Annex 1 countries. In particular, project 
investments must contribute to sustainable development in 
the host country, and must be independently certified in 
terms of ―certified emission reductions‖ or CERs.34 A CER 
                                                 
34
 Martin Khor, "Cancun Climate Conference: Some Key Issues,‖ The 
South Centre. Web. March 2011, 
29 
 
is a tradable unit issued by the United Nations (UN) through 
the CDM and is equal to one metric tonne of CO2 equivalent 
of GHG emissions reduction.  
 
CERs have become a commodity, which can be bought and 
sold in a new environmental market, for example at the 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), which is a voluntary 
GHG emissions cap-and-trade scheme based in North 
America. As such, the dictates of this market has led to 
daunting challenges for smaller economies, particularly those 
without international connections.  For example, transaction 
costs for implementation of the CDM are cost prohibitive for 
smaller economies. Additionally, only large scale operations 
in agroforestry, integrated rural forestry and energy related 
projects meet the CDM requirements. Furthermore, there is 
what is referred to as ―people issues‖35 that are byproducts of 
CDM investment projects that could have potential negative 
impacts on local food security and development options. 
Large forest sinks could run counter to other sustainable 
development initiatives seeking goods and services from 
forests that may be benefitting poor and forest-dependent 
people. 
 
CDM has been operational since the beginning of 2006 with 
over 4,200 registered projects. Of those registered, over 
1,000 projects could lead to certified emission reduction, 
(one tonne of CO2 = 1CER) of more than 2.9 billion tonnes 
of CO2 equivalent in the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol, 2008–2012. CDM is the only flexible 
mechanism available to Caribbean nations for emission-
reduction (or emission removal) projects to earn CER credits. 
These CERs can be traded and sold, and used by 
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industrialized countries to a meet a part of their emission 
reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The mechanism 
stimulates sustainable development and emission reductions, 
while providing industrialized countries some flexibility in 
meeting their emission reduction limitation targets. 
 
In Copenhagen in December 2009, developed countries 
committed to provide approximately $30 billion to 
developing countries to mitigate climate change effects 
between 2010 and 2012 for the most vulnerable countries, 
with a mid-term goal of 100 billion dollars a year by 2020. 
Furthermore, this money would be "new and additional," 
meaning that it was money, which had not been announced 
before. 'Additional' implied the funds would be additional to 
developed countries pre-existing aid commitments. 
However, nine months into 2010, developed countries have 
not lived up to their pledges. In fact, on a Netherlands 
published voluntary database where governments can 
disclose details on meeting their pledges, only six countries 
have put information on this website, and not all have 
forthwith on full details of their spending (World 
Development Movement). A CDM project activity might 
involve, for example, a rural electrification project using 
solar panels or the installation of more energy-efficient 
boilers. Energy projects, agro-forestry and integrated rural 
forestry have considerable livelihood benefits. However, 
only large scale operations will meet CDM requirements. For 
example, Norway has agreed to pay Guyana up to $250 
million for anti-deforestation measures that could lead to 
decreased greenhouse gas emissions. In order to be 
considered for registration, a project must first be approved 
by the Designated National Authority (DNA) that is 
ultimately responsible for ensuring that the CDM project 
contributes to the country’s sustainable development.  
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Financial and Market Barriers to CDM 
 
For smaller nations to take advantage of CDM, many 
challenges must be addressed. These include low 
economies of scale for renewable energy projects as 
compared with high transaction costs associated with 
developing a Project Development Design (PDD) report. 
Also, high transportation costs for travelling between 
countries to monitor and verify projects impose high 
implementation and operational barriers. In general, there is 
a lack of local accredited verifiers and in some cases, there 
is no DNA to oversee domestic CDM project activities. 
Furthermore, carbon funds are not readily available for 
small projects because focus has been placed on large 
projects. It is assumed, that as the global CDM market 
evolves, it may follow the path of foreign direct investment 
where the bulk of funding goes to a few larger developing 
countries with the infrastructure and institutions available 
to manage larger projects. The following chart documents 
the process for establishing a CDM project. 
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Figure 10:  A CDM Project Cycle 
 
Factors affecting CDM costs include: delivery risk 
associated with the host country, such as project financial 
and operational risks; availability of expertise within the host 
country (for example DOEs); and risks associated with the 
wider social impact of the project. For example, large forest 
sinks run counter to other sustainable development initiates 
seeking goods and services from the forest that may be 
benefiting the poor and forest-dependent people. There are 
also potential negative impacts on local food security and 
development options. To some extent, the more experience a 
country has with hosting CDM projects, the easier it is for 
the next developer to conduct business there.  
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Financial Options for CDM Projects 
 
Developing countries will have to take steps to find 
portfolio investors via the prototype carbon fund of the 
World Bank and other Development Assistance funding 
sources to link up with active development initiatives and 
attract CDM projects. One solution to the transaction cost 
dilemma is to use International Development Assistance 
funds to establish third party involvement through the 
implementation of a Climate Change & Clean 
Development Consortia comprising NGOs, Development 
Banks and/or Government Extension Services network. 
This will strengthen the capacities of climate centers to be 
able to generate and disseminate reliable climate 
information as well as enhance the capacities of country’s 
policy makers to be able to integrate the information into 
development planning. This will also provide consistent 
management and a financial and administrative system for 
cost-benefit sharing among many small players. 
 
CAP-and-Trade Versus Carbon Tax 
 
Cap-and-trade is a market-based approach suggested as a 
means to control pollution by providing economic incentives 
in order to reduce emissions of pollutants. A central 
authority or governmental body sets the limit (cap) on the 
amount of a pollutant that can be emitted. The limit is 
allocated or sold to other companies/agencies through 
emissions permits, representing the right to discharge a 
specific volume of the specified pollutant. Firms are then 
required to hold a number of permits, or carbon credits 
equivalent to their emissions, however the total number of 
permits cannot exceed the cap, thus limiting total emissions 
to that level. By transferring, or ―trading‖ these permits, a 
company can effectively pay a charge for polluting, while 
the seller is rewarded for having reduced emissions. 
Theoretically, this market-based approach allows those who 
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can reduce emissions most inexpensively to do so, while 
achieving pollution reduction at the lowest cost to society.  
 
Using this market approach, a ―Cap‖ is designated as a limit 
placed on emissions for a measured/compliance period from 
―covered sources‖ where a ―credit‖ can be either of two 
carbon commodities, an ―allowance‖, or an ―offset.‖ 
Allowances are allocated to covered sources, whereas offsets 
come from projects in uncovered sources. An Offset Credit 
is a tradable commodity that represents a reduction, 
avoidance or sequestration of 1 tonne of CO2 or equivalent 
GHG. In a voluntary or mandatory cap-and-trade scenario 
for example, it can be derived from a project in a non-
covered sector, such as agriculture or forestry. Covered 
sources can design their own compliance strategy, such as, 
reduce emissions to the cap, reduce below cap and sell 
unused allowances to others, or purchase offset credits and 
emit above cap. Emitters and other project developers can 
create offset credits to be used, banked or traded on an 
exchange. 
 
According to Clifton
36
, the current obsession with carbon 
trading as a primary tool for tackling climate change is high 
risk, irresponsible and dangerous. It is a distraction from 
more viable, more equitable, more effective solutions for 
tackling greenhouse gas emissions and providing adequate 
finance to developing countries for tackling climate change 
and adapting to its impacts. Carbon trading is unreliable, 
unproven and burdens developing countries with unfair 
responsibility for tackling climate change. The barriers to 
reforming carbon trading are insurmountable in practice 
within the time we have available to avoid catastrophic 
climate change. In addition, carbon market offsets are not a 
legitimate source of climate finance, and cannot guarantee a 
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predictable flow of finance to developing countries. This 
type of finance rarely supports genuine low carbon 
development. The biggest financial beneficiary of carbon 
trading is the Northern carbon trading industry. 
 
Cap-and-Trade is a complex system that is not transparent 
and has the potential for fraud. Nevertheless, it results in a 
steadily decreasing cap. As the market sets the price, there is 
always the potential for volatility. Whereas, a carbon tax 
system could be quickly implemented as the Government 
sets the price. It is more predictable, transparent and void of 
incentive to defraud. However, a steadily increasing tax can 
be expected. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
With funding from agencies such as the World Bank, the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) and European 
Development Finance Institutions (EDFI) (the latter parties 
intend to establish an investment matching facility to invest 
in private sector climate change projects in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, Asia and Latin America before 
the end of 2010) and others, technical cooperation projects 
could be funded to achieve the following: 
 
 Conduct Greenhouse gas inventories of selected 
industrial sectors. This will help a country to track its 
greenhouse gas emission levels. 
 Identify companies to finance all or co-finance part 
of a CDM project in return for full or shared financial 
returns and CERs.  A company financially 
contributes towards the cost of a CDM project equal 
to some portion of the incremental cost of the project 
over and above the baseline technology, or finances 
the removal of market barriers, in return for CERs. 
 Identify companies to provide loan or lease financing 
at concessional rates in return for CERs. 
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 Develop a Caribbean regional advisory body to 
provide assistance to Caribbean countries. 
 Establish sustainable development criteria and 
provide other technical assistance. 
 Develop a consistent host country approval process 
 Provide recommendations regarding individual 
project approval. 
 Develop specific CDM infrastructure and expertise 
for Caribbean countries. 
 Create Credit Facility for funding CDM projects 
utilizing renewable energy services such as solar 
LED lighting, solar water pumping, solar cookers and 
energy efficient biomass stoves and biomass 
gasifiers. 
 Create specific carbon funding facility for the 
Caribbean region to enable accessibility and decrease 
competition with larger economies. 
 Assist project  developers to implement CDM 
projects, monitor and report on the progress of the 
projects  in order to reduce transaction costs. 
 Develop capacity of UNFCCC focal points in the 
small islands developing states in order to establish 
and set up functions of a DNA for the host countries. 
 Develop separate funds for mitigation activities. 
 Utilize solar industry's potential to create jobs that 
help to reduce emissions, e.g. Europe's industry 
group said electricity from solar panels could 
feasibly make up 20 percent of the supply for the 
European Union by 2020. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Several scientific reports have revealed that the modest 
development gains that can be realized by some regions 
could be reversed by climate change. This means that 
climate change is not just a long-term environmental threat 
as was widely believed, but an economic and developmental 
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disaster that is unfolding.  As such, addressing climate 
change has become central to the development and poverty 
reduction by the World Bank and other financial institutions. 
Poorer countries and communities in Central America will 
suffer the hardest because of weaker resilience and greater 
reliance on climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture. The 
US should attempt to deliver capability to assist these states 
to deal with the effects of climate change. 
 
Central America will have to establish financial banking 
mechanisms that recognize and reward carbon sinks 
provided by agro-ecosystems and renewable energy systems. 
The CDM projects addressing climate change would ensure 
alignment with each country’s and regional priorities, as well 
as recipient participation in its identification, development 
and approval process. CDM funding should build on already 
existing mechanisms thereby promoting efficiency and 
accelerated results. Through both the public and private 
sector, CDM projects associated with renewable energy 
projects, energy efficiency, forestry, sustainable 
transportation and climate change adaptation projects could 
be designed to build resilience and place the nations on a low 
carbon-intensive growth trajectory.  
 
It is critical that the transition to a low-carbon economy, 
while driven by the need for environmental justice, does not 
in itself lead to further economic and social injustices. 
Policies and measures to address greenhouse gas emissions 
and support economic transition must ensure job creation, 
protect pay conditions, ensure health and safety for workers 
and respect and promote the rights of local communities and 
indigenous peoples.  It should protect low-income groups, 
and guard against the creation of further economic and social 
injustice. Most importantly it should also ensure good 
governance, including participation of affected workers and 
communities in the development of policies and measures to 
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tackle climate change, and transparency, accountability and 
democratic control over decision making.
37
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